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SYMPOSIUM
WHEN CONSCIENCE CLASHES WITH
STATE LAW & POLICY:
CATHOLIC INSTITUTIONS
SUSAN J. STABILEt
There has been a lot of public attention of late to issues
involving a clash between the conscience of Catholic institutions
and state law and public policy. The issue of a Catholic
institution's conscience can arise in a number of different
circumstances. Does a religious employer have to provide
contraception coverage for its employees? Does a Catholic
hospital have to provide access to emergency contraception and
must it provide abortion services? Must a Catholic adoption
agency allow gay persons or same-sex couples to adopt children?
Another area where the issue has come up-although this is
not one I will address in this talk-is the question of whether
religious employers have to hire people who practice or hold
views antithetical to Catholic teaching. Where this has received
public attention recently has been in the context of faith-based
programs that receive federal funds in connection with their
services-ranging from job placement to addiction treatment to
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provision of children's services-and who want to hire only
people of the faith of the group in question. There was also press
not long ago about the Salvation Army's requirement that
employees, as a condition of employment, pledge support of the
organization's mission to "proclaim the Gospel of Jesus Christ."
At another level, there is also the question of whether a religious
employer who hires a homosexual employee must be forced to
provide benefits to same-sex partners. That last issue arose
several years ago in Maine, when Portland passed an ordinance
that any employer who accepted certain city grants had to
provide such benefits. Both Catholic Charities and the Salvation
Army lost substantial city funds when they refused to provide
such benefits.
I want to distinguish questions of institutional conscience
from questions of individual conscience, such as, for example, the
question of whether an individual pharmacist can decline to fill a
prescription because it is for something he has religious objection
to. Although it is the refusal of pharmacists to fill prescriptions
for emergency contraception that has received the most recent
attention, the pharmacist conscience issue first arose in the
context of pharmacists in Oregon concerned about taking part in
assisted suicide. Oregon, as many of you know, has a state law-
the Death with Dignity Act'-that allows terminally ill Oregon
residents to obtain a physician's prescription and use it to obtain
and administer lethal medications. The statute has a number of
requirements, but a patient who meets those requirements ends
up with a prescription that then has to be filled. The pharmacist
conscience issue has also come up in other contexts as well, such
as death penalty lethal injection and the example of the
pharmacist in Texas who refused to fill a prescription for Ritalin
for a child.
Individual conscience cases raise equally important
questions of the balance between consumers' right to medical
services and prescriptions and the moral concerns of individual
pharmacists, physicians, and other providers. However, those
issues are beyond the scope of my comments this evening.
Why are these questions about conscience clashes arising
with such frequency? I think there are two explanations. The
first is the fact that we are very quick in American society to
1 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.995 (2005).
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move from negative rights to positive rights, that is, to move from
saying that the law should not interfere with someone's ability to
do something to saying the law-and everyone else-must
affirmatively support the person's ability to do that thing. Thus,
with respect to contraception, we have moved from saying
individuals ought to be free to use contraceptives without
interference from the law-forming the basis of passing laws
decriminalizing the use of contraceptives-to saying, "I can't pay
for my contraceptives (or I don't want to pay for them), someone
must pay for me." With abortion, we have moved from saying
there is not a sufficient state interest for the law to make
abortions illegal in all circumstances to saying that law and
society must facilitate one's right to obtain an abortion. With
respect to homosexual relationships, the move is from saying no
discrimination to no one can make any distinctions between
heterosexuality and homosexuality for any reason. I think it is
important to recognize this easy movement that we make as a
society because it means we are on a slippery slope that will
continue.
The second explanation for the frequent rise of conscience
clashes is that many of these areas involve the Church's position
on matters sexual, which has become a lightening rod for many
people. As a result, although the law has traditionally afforded
religious institutions a level of freedom of conscience, there is a
move to erode that freedom. Thus, while Catholic health care
institutions have been protected from being required to perform
medical procedures to which they object, such as abortion, these
protections have come under increasing attack by those
concerned that they result in an unwarranted restriction
on the availability of reproductive health services. An argument
increasingly voiced is that Catholic hospitals operate in the
public sector and receive public funds and therefore should not
impose restrictions on the availability of reproductive health
services. The result has been proposals to deny federal funds to
Catholic hospitals that refuse to provide certain reproductive
health services and the enactment by several states of laws
requiring all hospitals, including Catholic hospitals, to provide
emergency contraception to rape victims. The same opposition to
conscience protection is evident in other areas as well.
The clash between institutional conscience and state law and
policy raises a number of interesting questions. Should the law
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protect religious institutions from the operation of generally
applicable laws where compliance with the law would force an
institution to violate its conscience? What kind of burden on
religion is sufficient to give rise to an exclusion from otherwise
generally applicable state laws? How should we balance the
burden on religion against the state public policy goals that
conflict with religion? Even where the burden on religion does
not meet the standard for an Establishment Clause violation,
should the state nonetheless find ways less intrusive on religion
to achieve public policy goals? If there should be some protection
and respect, how should we define a religious institution for
these purposes?
I'd like to focus on several of these questions. Before I do, let
me say at the outset that my consideration of these questions
proceeds from two foundational assumptions. The first is that
religion is special. By that I mean that, although there are many
reasons one may be opposed to something, opposition to a
particular practice based on the claim that the practice is
inconsistent with one's religious beliefs is something that is
deserving of special consideration. I say this at the outset
because I recognize that it is not something with which everyone
would agree; some would argue that there is nothing special
about religious objections. My starting point is that the law
should provide certain protections for religious beliefs that it
need not necessarily provide for other beliefs.
My second foundational assumption is that, to warrant
protection, it is sufficient that the religious institution's
opposition to a practice is a sincere part of its religious belief.
That is, it is irrelevant whether or not I, or anyone else, agree
with the position of the Catholic Church on the issues of
contraception, abortion, or homosexuality. That these are deeply
held religious beliefs is enough. It is my firm conviction that
debates about the extent to which the law ought to protect the
conscience of institutions should not turn into a referendum on
the Church's position on these matters. Again, I say this at the
outset because I know that it is difficult for some people not to
make the issue about the soundness of Church doctrine-
particularly when it comes to the Church's position on
contraception, with which so many people, including many
Catholics, disagree.
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One other thing I should add as a preliminary matter is that
I am not primarily talking about a constitutional question here.
The clash with religion that we are talking about here is not
likely to create a First Amendment violation. At least under
current Supreme Court jurisprudence, as a constitutional matter,
the state does not have to carve out special protection for
religious institutions from laws that have the effect of violating
conscience.
In its 1990 decision in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith,2 the Supreme Court refused to apply
strict scrutiny to neutral laws of general applicability, even if
those laws carry the incidental effect of burdening a particular
religious practice. Accordingly, a state need not establish a
compelling state interest in support of laws that result in
incidental burdens on religious practices. Although Congress
attempted an end run around Smith, adopting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") in 1993 to restore the
compelling state interest test, in City of Boerne v. Flores3 the
Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state
and local legislation.
Those two decisions make it easy for a state to enact broad-
based legislation that has the effect of burdening religions. Thus,
for example, based on Smith, courts in both California and New
York have rejected claims that statutes in California and New
York that require employers to provide prescription contraceptive
coverage for their employees violate the First Amendment.4
Although I am not a constitutional law scholar, I think those are
predictable results given Smith. If one could demonstrate that
laws are motivated by animus towards Catholics, or appear to
single out Catholic institutions, perhaps an argument could be
made that strict scrutiny is appropriate. However, given the
state's ability to put forward plausible public health and equal
protection justifications for such laws-albeit justifications I do
not find persuasive, as I will suggest a little later in my talk-
that is an unlikely result.
2 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
3 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
4 See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 73-
74, 82 (Cal. 2004); Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 7 N.Y.3d 510,
518, 521-22, 859 N.E.2d 459, 461, 463-64, 825 N.Y.S.2d 653, 655, 657-58 (2006).
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Thus, I will not be speaking in constitutional terms. Rather,
I want to focus on the normative question of how we should deal
with clashes between the conscience of religious institutions and
law and public policy. I will do that by considering three
questions.
QUESTION 1: ASSUMING THE LAW SHOULD PROTECT THE
CONSCIENCE OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS, How SHOULD WE
DEFINE A RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION FOR THESE PURPOSES?
The question here is: Who should law be protecting? To give
some specific content to this question, consider state statutes
that mandate prescription contraceptive coverage. Most, but not
all, of these statutes contain some exclusion for churches and
other religious organizations. Those exclusions are framed in
various ways. Although some statutes exempt church groups
and church-controlled organizations, others are drafted
substantially more narrowly. Illustrative of the narrow approach
that creates difficulties for Catholic organizations are the
statutes passed by California and New York, the California
Women's Contraception Equity Act, 5 which was enacted in 1999,
and the New York Women's Health and Wellness Act,6 which
went into effect in January 2003.
Both the New York and the California statutes require all
commercial health insurance plans that offer prescription drug
coverage to provide coverage of prescription contraceptives. The
New York and California statutes both also impose a four-part
test for whether an entity qualifies as a religious employer and
thus is excluded from the mandate of the statutes. To qualify for
the religious employer exclusion, (1) the purpose of the
organization must be to inculcate religious values; (2) the
organization must primarily employ persons of same faith;
(3) the organization must primarily serve persons of same faith;
and (4) the organization must be organized as a non-profit under
Internal Revenue Code section 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) or (iii), rather
than section 501(c)(3). This four-fold definition of religious
employer excuses churches themselves from the statutory
mandate, meaning that employees who work in churches, parish
5 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1) (Deering 2007); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10123.196(d)(1) (Deering 2007).
6 N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 3221(1)(16)(A)(1), 4303(cc)(1)(A) (McKinney 2007).
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rectories, diocesan chanceries, and seminaries would not have to
be provided coverage, but it does not provide protection for
entities such as Catholic Charities, Catholic hospitals or nursing
homes, or Catholic institutions of higher learning, which serve
and employ people without regard to religion.
In my view, the New York and California approach reflects a
fundamental misunderstanding of, and therefore lack of respect
for, what it means to be Catholic and what constitutes Catholic
religious activity. I say that for two reasons. First, the narrow
definition of religious institution ignores the pervasiveness of the
Catholic religious mission. Second, it ignores the Church's
evangelization role. Let me say a little about each of those
because I think both are relevant for deciding what we mean by a
Catholic institution.
Defining a religious employer as an entity with a primary
purpose to inculcate religious values or beliefs misperceives the
impossibility for Catholics of separating worship and acts of
charity and social justice and ignores the pervasiveness of the
Catholic religious mission. For the Catholic Church, running
hospitals, nursing homes, schools, and other social services is not
a secular activity, not something separate from or unrelated to
its core religious mission.
In the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus defines as the sole criterion
for choosing who will be blessed in God's kingdom: "For I was
hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me
drink, a stranger and you welcomed me, naked and you clothed
me, ill and you cared for me, in prison and you visited me." 7
When asked by his confused followers when it was that they
fed him and cared for him, his response was: "[W]hatever you
did for one of these least brothers of mine, you did for me."8 As
theologian Michael Himes explains, "the criterion of judgment
has nothing to do with any explicitly religious action. The
criterion is not whether we were baptized, or prayed, or read
Scripture, or received the Eucharist,"9 that is, not the things that
fall into a narrow view of what constitutes religious activity but
rather, caring for those in need.
7 Matthew 25:35-36 (New American).
8 Matthew 25:40.
9 MICHAEL J. HIMES, THE MYSTERY OF FAITH: AN INTRODUCTION TO
CATHOLICISM 9 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
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This teaching of Jesus is one of the basic elements of
Catholic social teaching today, expressed in the notion of "the
option or love of preference for the poor." 10 In the words of Pope
John Paul II, "[t]he many initiatives on behalf of the elderly, the
sick and the needy, through nursing homes, hospitals,
dispensaries, canteens providing free meals, and other social
centers are a concrete testimony of the preferential love for the
poor which the Church in America nurtures. She does so because
of her love for the Lord.. . ."I In offering health and other social
services, far more than merely satisfying material needs, the
Church proclaims the Gospel; it "shows forth God's infinite love
for all people and becomes an effective way of communicating the
hope of salvation which Christ has brought to the world, a hope
which glows in a special way when it is shared with those
abandoned or rejected by society."12
Thus, when a Catholic organization cares for the elderly or
the sick, or provides for education, it is performing an act as
religious as those that take place inside a church building. This
is a fact that has been recognized and respected by the law in
other instances, with courts holding that a Catholic Church's
provision of outdoor sleeping space for the homeless, or their
activities of feeding the hungry and offering clothing to the poor,
are religious activities protected by the Free Exercise clause. 13
Similarly, courts have held that the Boy Scouts of America is a
religious organization and that Catholic healthcare entities are
religious organizations for purposes of exemptions from state fair
employment statutes. 14 With respect to Catholic Charities, the
subject of the California litigation, one federal court has held that
an employee benefit plan maintained by Catholic Charities was a
"church plan[]" within the meaning of ERISA. It reasoned that
10 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS 42 (1987).
11 JOHN PAUL II, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION ECCLESIA IN
AMERICA 18 (1999).
12 Id.
13 See Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 572
(2d Cir. 2002); Espinosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477, 479, 482 (10th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 456
U.S. 951 (1982).
14 See Barnes-Wallace v. Boy Scouts of Am., 275 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (S.D.
Cal. 2003) (holding the Boy Scouts to be a religious institution); McKeon v. Mercy
Healthcare Sacramento, 965 P.2d 1189, 1189-91, 1195 (Cal. 1998) (holding Mercy
Healthcare to be a religious employer), superseded by statute, California Fair
Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926.2(c) (Deering 2007), as
recognized in Silo v. CHW Med. Found., 45 P.3d 1162 (Cal. 2002).
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Catholic Charities "has close ties with the Roman Catholic
Church in that it has membership, governing bodies, trustees
and officers in common with the Roman Catholic Diocese of
Portland [Maine] ... and aims to implement the social teachings
of the Catholic Church."15 As a result, the court concluded that
the plans maintained by Catholic Charities were established and
maintained by the church for its employees.
Jesus does not teach his followers to provide care only for
those who have accepted his teaching. The mission of those who
would follow Christ is to feed all who are hungry and care for all
those who are in need. Thus, the fact that Catholic organizations
serve members of other faiths as well as their own is part of its
calling. Precisely because it is part of the religious mission to
serve all, the fact that health and other social services are
provided by Catholic organizations to members of other faiths
does not transform the provision of such services from a religious
to a secular act.
Statutory definitions such as those contained in the New
York and California statutes fail to recognize this reality. They
are built on a congregational model that sees religious activity as
largely confined to the worship hall, that sees religion as
fundamentally a private relationship between the individual and
God. They thus define as secular, rather than religious, activity
that under the Catholic faith is part of its core religious mission.
As one commentator observed, under such a view, "Mother
Teresa's Missionaries of Charity are 'secular' employers because
they do not limit their care of AIDS victims to Catholics."16
The state's attempt to force Catholic religious belief and
practice into a model not its own raises important issues of
Church self-determination. It is for the Church, not the state, to
define what the Church is and what is its mission-what it
means to be Catholic. For the state to determine that certain
activities that are required by a Church's faith are not
sufficiently religious is to interfere with religion to an
unwarranted extent.
In addition to ignoring the pervasiveness of the Catholic
religious mission, the definition of religious employer contained
15 Catholic Charities of Me., Inc. v. City of Portland, 304 F. Supp. 2d 77, 82-83
(D. Me. 2004).
16 Mark E. Chopko, Shaping the Church: Overcoming the Twin Challenges of
Secularization and Scandal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 143 (2003).
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in the New York and California statutes also ignores the
evangelization role of the Catholic Church. Just as do all
Catholics, institutions affiliated with the Catholic Church are
obliged to make Jesus known in the world. Jesus instructed his
disciples to go throughout the world to make followers of all
nations and Catholics are called to do the same in the world. In
Christifideles Laici, Pope John Paul II wrote:
The entire mission of the Church, then, is concentrated and
manifested in evangelization. Through the winding passages of
history the Church has made her way under the grace and the
command of Jesus Christ: "Go into all the world and preach the
gospel to the whole creation" (Mk 16:15). ". . . and lo, I am with
you always, until the close of the age" (Mt 28:20). "To
evangelize," writes Paul VI, "is the grace and vocation proper to
the Church, her most profound identity."17
As the Pope's words make clear, the Church's central and
fundamental evangelization vocation requires that Catholics go
out into the world among those who do not share the Catholic
faith to proclaim the Gospel. Given this vocation, one can hardly
be surprised to learn that, in fulfilling their religious mission to
serve the needy, Catholic institutions both serve and hire non-
Catholics. They do so as part of their evangelizing vocation,
standing on its head the statutory assumption that an entity can
only be a religious employer if it both employs and serves
exclusively or even primarily members of its own faith. From the
Church's side, its obligation is to nurture the spiritual growth,
consistent with the Catholic faith, of all of its employees.
As my comments suggest, religious institution must be
defined in a way that sufficiently reflects Catholic faith.
Therefore, it is problematic for the law to enact a legal definition
of religious institution that is based on who the institution
employs or serves. It should be enough that the entity is
affiliated with the Church, that it be accountable to ecclesiastical
authorities and is committed to the moral teachings and ethical
norms of the Church. In the case of Catholic hospitals, this is
true even where the administration of the hospital has, due to
declining ranks of sponsoring orders, been delegated to lay
governing boards.
17 JOHN PAUL II, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION CHRISTIFIDELES
LAICI 33 (1988).
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I fully recognize that this creates an issue in a pluralist
society, i.e., the fact that a Catholic institution serves or employs
non-Catholics means that the Church's position is in some
way being extended to non-Catholics. For example, in the
contraception context, the concern expressed by the state in
articulating a requirement that an organization hire members of
its own faith in order to be considered a religious employer is to
avoid a burden on employees who do not share the same faith. If
a religious employer employs persons of different faiths, the
concern is that the failure of a religious employer to cover
contraceptives imposes its beliefs on a religiously diverse
workforce. Thus, the lower court decision in the California
Catholic Charities litigation suggests that the idea behind the
statutory definition is that in order to be excluded from the
coverage mandate, the entity employs only persons "who, one
reasonably could conclude based on the religious nature of the
employment, agree with or willingly defer their personal choices
to the religious tenets espoused by their employer."' 8
There is some basis for this concern. If non-Catholics take
employment with Catholic employers, there may be points where
the Catholic nature of the employer causes it to act in ways that
are inconsistent with the preferences of the non-Catholic
employee. On the other hand, employees hired by Catholic
institutions are hired with the understanding that the religious
nature of their employer has certain implications. Physicians
hired by Catholic hospitals, for example, sign statements that
they understand and will abide by the NCCB Ethical and
Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. Other
employees are told at orientations that they are expected to
conduct themselves in a manner not inconsistent with core
Catholic values.
The Church's position on birth control is well-known.
Employees who take employment with a Catholic employer do so
with the understanding of the Church's position and with no
expectation that the Catholic employer will act in a way
inconsistent with its beliefs. And, of course, the Catholic
employer is not forcing its employees not to use birth control; it is
merely saying it is not willing to participate in the employees'
18 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d
176, 190 (Ct. App. 2001), aff'd, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004).
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acquisition of it by paying for it. Thus, the Church here is not
attempting to impose its views on birth control on others.
Rather, it is simply asking that it be free to maintain and act
consistently with its religious beliefs.
QUESTION 2: ASSUMING THE LAW SHOULD PROTECT
THE CONSCIENCE OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS, WHAT
KIND OF BURDEN ON RELIGION IS SUFFICIENT TO GIVE
RISE TO AN EXCLUSION FROM OTHERWISE GENERALLY
APPLICABLE STATE LAWS?
Consider the potential effect of laws addressing the examples
with which I started: forcing a Catholic hospital to provide an
abortion; forcing a Catholic employer to pay for its employee's
contraception; and forcing a Catholic adoption agency to place a
child for adoption with a homosexual couple. Are these the same
kind of burdens, or are there differences that should affect how
the law treats the issues?
Forcing a Catholic hospital to actually perform abortions
would seem the gravest threat to religious freedom. The
Church's position on abortion is unambiguous and needs no
elaboration. The Catechism of the Catholic Church states that
"[h]uman life must be respected and protected absolutely from
the moment of conception." 19 The Catechism characterizes it as
an "unchangeable" teaching that every "procured abortion" is a
"moral evil."20 The position of the Church is that this is not just a
matter of individual conscience and sin. The Catechism goes on
to state that "[t]he inalienable right to life of every innocent
human individual is a constitutive element of a civil society and
its legislation,"21 thus rejecting the ability to claim that abortion
is a wrong but that the matter is one of individual choice. The
same notion is expressed in the 1984 papal Charter on the Rights
of the Family, which provides that "[hluman life must be
respected and protected absolutely from the moment of
conception," and that "[a]bortion is a direct violation of the
fundamental right to life of the human being."22 In his 1995
encyclical, Evangelium Vitae, Pope John Paul II characterized
19 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2270 (2d ed. 1997).
20 Id. 2271.
21 Id. 2273.
22 PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR THE FAMILY, CHARTER RIGHTS OF THE FAMILY, Art.
4 (Oct. 22, 1983).
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laws permitting abortion as "radically opposed not only to the
good of the individual but also to the common good" and
as "intrinsically unjust."23  The Church has been vocal and
consistent in both its opposition to abortion and to legal efforts in
any country to permit or expand access to abortion.
Here, we are not talking about asking a Catholic institution
to sit by and allow something to happen in its presence. Rather
we are talking about forcing the institution to actually perform
the act it views to be a moral evil. It is hard to imagine placing a
graver burden on religion.
Some would argue that forcing a religious employer to
provide prescription contraception coverage for its employees
creates a lesser burden. If it does, it can't be because the issue is
not sufficiently important to the Church. The Church's position
on the use of artificial means of birth control is no less
ambiguous than its position on abortion. From the 1931
publication of Casti Connubii by Pope Pius XI, written in
response to the Anglican church's approval of birth control at
their Lambeth Conference of 1930, the Church has consistently
condemned the use of artificial contraception. Humanae Vitae
reaffirmed that the use of any method of birth control other than
natural family planning is prohibited. The view of the Church is
that artificial contraception perverts nature and is an act
contrary to the will of God.
Notwithstanding the strength of the Church's opposition to
artificial contraception, those who support the application of
mandatory contraceptive clauses to religious employers argue
that the statutes impose no significant burden on religion
because the statute only requires employers to provide access to
contraceptives and religious employers are still free to
convey to their employees their moral opposition to the use of
contraceptives. Thus, they claim the statute involves no
endorsement by the employer of the use of birth control. This is
an argument that has some appeal to those who would prefer
that the Church should accomplish its aims by persuasion rather
than by force.
I find this argument unpersuasive. I talked earlier about the
Church's evangelization role. Evangelization occurs by both
direct and indirect means and requires that Catholic institutions
23 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLIcAL LErER EVANGELIUM VITAE 72-73 (1995).
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act in accordance with their religious beliefs. One evangelizes
not merely by what one says, but, more importantly, by what one
does, that is, by witness as much as by teaching. "In the
Christian tradition, a faith not expressed in conduct is
inauthentic. ' '24  It is thus necessary that what a Catholic
institution does reflects the Gospel and Christ. As Thomas
Merton wrote, "[g]estures of conformity do not make a man a
Christian, and when one's actual conduct obviously belies the
whole meaning of the gesture, it is an objective statement that
one's Christianity has lost its meaning."25
The idea that "actions speak louder than words" renders
unpersuasive the argument that mandatory contraception
statutes do not require endorsement of birth control by religious
employers. It is not enough for a religious employer say one is
opposed on moral grounds to contraception if one is paying for its
employees to obtain it; the condemnation of the act is inauthentic
if the religious employer is paying for what it believes to be
immoral. As Catholic Charities has argued,
[w]hen an organization pays for an activity, the message that is
ordinarily communicated is that the organization endorses
or approves of the activity. When a religious institution
subsidizes particular conduct, the inescapable message is that it
does not disapprove of that conduct. A religious institution
cannot communicate an effective message that conduct is sinful
at the same time that it pays for that conduct to occur. 26
The religious employer being asked to pay for prescription
contraception coverage for its employees is being asked to
facilitate and pay for that which it believes to be morally evil. As
Martin Luther King, Jr., once observed, "noncooperation with
evil is as much a moral obligation as is cooperation with good." 27
So, while the burden may be less than that placed on a Catholic
hospital being asked to perform an abortion, it is still a
substantial burden.
What about the burden on religion placed by a requirement
that a Catholic adoption agency place a child for adoption with a
24 Chopko, supra note 16, at 146.
25 THOMAS MERTON, CONJECTURES OF A GUILTY BYSTANDER 95 (1966).
26 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *13-14, Catholic Charities of Sacramento,
Inc. v. California, 543 U.S. 816 (2004) (No. 03-1618), 2004 WL 1243136.
27 THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 14 (Clayborne Carson
ed., 1998).
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homosexual person or a same-sex couple? I should say at the
start that this is a question to which I had not given a significant
amount of thought prior to preparing for this talk. The abortion
and contraception questions are ones I have talked and written
about; this is one that I have only really observed at the
periphery.
As with the abortion and contraception issue, there is no
ambiguity regarding the Church's position on homosexuality. A
2003 document issued by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
faith called gay adoption "gravely immoral" and said that
allowing children to be adopted by same sex couples "would
actually mean doing violence to these children. ."... 2 The
document ends by saying that gay adoptions are "gravely
immoral and in open contradiction to the principle ... that the
best interests of the child, as the weaker and more vulnerable
party, are to be the paramount consideration in every case."29
As a result of the 2003 document, the Catholic bishops of
Massachusetts announced an intent to seek an exemption from
state antidiscrimination laws to allow Catholic entities such as
Catholic Charities to exclude homosexual couples as prospective
adoptees. One of the core missions of Catholic Charities has been
to find homes for needy and abandoned children and it
historically has successfully placed some of the most difficult
children to adopt. It also over the years placed a small number of
children-13 out of 720-with homosexual couples; all were
children who had been abused or neglected and were considered
hard to place because they were older or had special needs. The
decision by the bishops led to a firestorm of controversy.
Massachusetts law is equally clear. Any agency in
Massachusetts that handles adoptions must obtain a state
license, which prohibits them from turning down prospective
parents based on sexual orientation, religion, and race, among
other factors. If an agency knowingly discriminates, it could be
stripped of its license to broker all adoptions. At issue is whether
the Church and Catholic Charities should be exempt from this
requirement.
28 CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DOCTRINAL DOCUMENT
CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING PROPOSALS TO GIvE LEGAL RECOGNITION TO UNIONS
BETWEEN HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS 7 (2003).
29 Id.
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Again, the issue is not whether the Church is right in its
position; many would argue against the conclusion that it is
better for a child not to be adopted than to be adopted by a gay
couple. The question, however, is the extent to which religion is
burdened by being forced to act in a way inconsistent with its
beliefs.
Clearly, to force Catholic Charities to place a child with a
homosexual couple would burden its religious beliefs. The
difference between the abortion situation and the contraception
and adoptions situations is that in the latter two examples, the
religious entity has a choice. In the case of the contraception
statutes, the religious employer can choose not to provide any
prescription contraception coverage, which removes it from the
mandate of the statute. (To avoid the problem of preemption by
ERISA, the statutes all read the same way: An employer who
provides any prescription coverage must also provide prescription
contraception coverage.) In the case of adoptions, the Catholic
institution can avoid the burden by simply ceasing to engage in
adoptions. Indeed, last March Catholic Charities of Boston
announced that the agency would end its adoption activity rather
than comply with state law requiring that gays be allowed to
adopt. The Rev. J. Bryan Hehir, president of Catholic Charities
of Boston, and Jeffrey Kaneb, chairman of the board, said that
after wrestling with the issue, they could not reconcile church
teaching that says placing children in gay homes is "immoral"
with Massachusetts law prohibiting discrimination against gays.
Hehir, announcing the decision, called it "a difficult and sad day
for Catholic Charities."30 Catholic Charities of California made a
similar decision in August of last year.
In both cases, the response is that the religious entity is
being forced to choose to act in a way inconsistent with its
broader mission. The religious employer believes that not
providing its employees with any prescription coverage is an act
of injustice. Catholic Charities is being forced to abandon
something that has been a core part of its mission. Catholic
Charities of San Francisco, for example, was started 99 years ago
with the stated mission to help orphan children. I leave to you to
wrestle with the question of how great a burden you think that
30 Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2006, at Al.
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is. Clearly in both cases, the burden is less than that which
would be imposed if the law required a Catholic hospital to
provide abortions or emergency contraception. But is it a great
enough burden to warrant legal protection? My own view is yes.
QUESTION 3: HOW Do WE BALANCE THE BURDEN ON RELIGION
AGAINST THE STATE'S PUBLIC POLICY INTEREST?
This last question really involves two sub-questions: What is
state interest? And should the state find means that are less
intrusive on religion to achieve its public policy goals?
Let's start by identifying the state interest involved, again,
sticking to the three examples I just discussed. First, when we
talk about laws requiring Catholic hospitals to provide abortions,
we are talking about both abortions and the administration of
emergency contraception where it cannot be demonstrated that
conception has not already occurred. That is, standard care for
treatment of female sexual assault victims is administration of
emergency contraception. The guidelines applicable to Catholic
hospitals allow the administration of emergency contraception by
Catholic institutions where a woman is a victim of sexual
assault and where there is no evidence upon testing that
conception has already occurred. Thus, the legal mandate would
require administration of emergency contraception even where
conception has already occurred, i.e., where the use of the
emergency contraceptive is abortive. Thus, I treat the two legal
mandates as essentially the same.
The state interest in requiring Catholic hospitals to provide
abortion (or emergency contraception) is access to reproductive
health services. Due in part to the closure of non-Catholic
hospitals in rural areas and in part to mergers between Catholic
and non-Catholic hospitals, there are now 76 Catholic hospitals
in 26 states that are "sole providers," that is, which are located in
areas where no other hospitals are easily accessible. 31 Mergers of
Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals generally result in the
elimination of some, if not all, reproductive health services
(including not only abortion, but sterilization, birth control drugs,
devices and information, and in vitro fertilization). Thus, for
31 PLANNED PARENTHOOD FED'N OF AM., OPPOSING DANGEROUS HOSPITAL
MERGERS 2 (1999), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/PPFA/fact-hospital-
mergers.pdf.
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example in California, where mergers between Catholic and non-
Catholic hospitals have become especially prevalent and have
threatened access for isolated rural and economically
disadvantaged areas, legislators and advocates have proposed a
bill that, among other things, would expressly require all
hospitals to provide a full range of reproductive health services
as a condition of government funding and merger approval.
Why should the state care about access to abortion? It is one
thing to say that the state does not have a sufficient interest to
prohibit someone from obtaining an abortion. It is another to say
that there is a state interest in affirmatively providing abortions.
The argument often made is that reproductive health care is
an essential part of meeting public health needs. It is claimed
that the health effects that result from a lack of reproductive
health services or information can be dire. For example, a
patient may have some medical condition or illness that would be
aggravated by carrying a fetus to term, jeopardizing the woman's
health or life, making abortion necessary to protect the woman's
health or life. Even where there is not threat to life, access to
reproductive health services may be necessary to avoid the
physical and psychological effects resulting from pregnancy.
Even if one accepts that in some cases there is a legitimate public
health argument based on the need to protect the life and health
of the mother, that is a pretty narrow interest upon which to
justify broad requirements on Catholic hospitals, especially
where there are other hospitals in the community providing
these services.
I should add that sometimes the state interest here is framed
simply as promoting autonomy. That is, for example, a rape
victim has a right of privacy and autonomy that should be
promoted. Here we are pitting the individual's privacy and
autonomy interest against the religious institution's religious
freedom. Many would argue that promotion of the privacy and
autonomy interests should trump, illustrating my earlier point
about the movement from negative to positive rights. This
argument says: Not only can't you tell me I can't do this; you
must help me do it even if it is against your religious beliefs.
Effectively, my autonomy trumps yours. Phrased that way, the
argument is nothing short of outrageous.
Second, when we are talking about laws requiring Catholic
employers to provide prescription contraception coverage, the
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articulated state interests fall into two categories: claims that
such mandatory coverage promotes equal treatment of women
and claims that such coverage preserves public health. Although
both propositions have been accepted by courts, both are
debatable.
The claim that the failure to cover prescription contraception
discriminates against women is questionable. Several arguments
have been advanced to support the proposition that excluding
contraceptives from insurance coverage disproportionately
impacts women. The first argument is that because prescription
contraception must be obtained and used by women, women bear
the physical risks and inconvenience that accompanies the use of
prescription contraception. The second is that the result of
excluding coverage for prescription contraception and including
other prescription coverage is that women bear higher out-of-
pocket health care costs than do men.
Regarding the first argument, it is certainly the case that
women currently bear the physical risk and inconvenience of
using prescription contraception, but it is not clear how that
translates into an argument that employers must cover
prescription contraceptives under their plan. Whether or not
contraceptives are covered by insurance, women will still bear
the physical risk and inconvenience. Regarding the second
argument, the fact that women bear more out-of-pocket health
care costs than men is hardly solely caused by the failure of
insurance plans to cover prescription contraceptives. Estimates
showing that women have higher health plan costs than men
consider not only the cost of prescription contraceptive coverage,
but the costs of unintended pregnancies. Yet, no link (significant
or insignificant) has been shown to exist between unintended
pregnancies and the failure of plans to cover prescription
contraceptives. Moreover, without examining the totality of
benefits provided by an employer's health plan to women versus
men, it is impossible to demonstrate that the greater cost
imposed on women results from differences in plan coverage
versus different levels of illness or other usage of medical
services. I have seen no analysis of total plan coverage or of
comparative illness or usage levels by anyone who has made a
disproportionate impact argument.
A third argument that has been advanced is that the
exclusion of contraceptives discriminates on the basis of sex or
2007]
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pregnancy because prescription contraceptives are used only by
women. However, it is a mistake to view a health plan's
exclusion of prescription contraceptives in isolation. Were
prescription contraceptives the only plan exclusion, a conclusion
that the plan discriminated on the basis of sex or pregnancy
might be understandable. However, all plans have exclusions of
various types. Although the shift to the provision of medical
benefits through HMOs and other managed care providers has
resulted in an increase in coverage for preventive services such
as well baby care and adult physicals, depending on the plan in
question, the plan may exclude various services such as cosmetic
surgery, human growth hormones, hearing aids and routine foot
care. Prescription contraceptives are merely one member of a
class of items excluded-which class applies to both males and
females alike.
In addition, the failure of health plans to include
prescription contraceptives applies to both sexes. Although
prescription contraception is currently available only to women,
that limited availability is only a matter of timing; research
suggests that the availability of male prescription contraceptives
is not many years away.
My own view is that there is not a compelling argument that
coverage of contraceptives is necessary to promote equal
treatment of women. In reality, the genesis of this claim is the
vociferous outcry that arose when health insurance plans began
to cover Viagra after that drug was approved by the FDA. While
it may have rankled women to see Viagra covered when birth
control was not, thus setting the stage for fights over
contraceptive coverage, the situations are not analogous.
However else it may be used, Viagra is designed to treat a
medical disorder-infertility-and plans generally pay for the
drug only when it is being used for that purpose.
With respect to the second state interest asserted, despite its
widespread acceptance as a political matter, the claim that
prescription contraception is a basic health care need is hardly
self-evident. Two arguments have been made. First, it is argued
that contraception is a basic health care need based on the fact
that it is medically undesirable for a woman to have 12 to 15
pregnancies over the course of her fertile years, the estimated
number of pregnancies that a woman would have if she used no
contraception during her child-bearing years. Second, it is
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argued that adverse consequences flow from unintended
pregnancies.
Even if one accepts the truth of both of the foregoing
statements, neither is a persuasive argument for why employers
should be forced to provide coverage for prescription
contraceptives. This is true for several reasons. First, I have
seen no evidence demonstrating that women who want to use
prescription contraception coverage are unable to do so because
their employer does not cover it. More specifically, what must be
demonstrated is that significant numbers of employed women
whose employer provides prescription coverage that excludes
contraceptive coverage are unable to obtain contraceptives
because of the cost involved. Without such a demonstration,
there is no link between forcing employers to provide
contraception coverage and the public health benefits sought to
be achieved.
In evaluating any evidence that might be produced on this
point, it is necessary to keep in mind that plans have prescription
co-pays. Given the cost of prescription contraception, the out-of-
pocket expenses for an employee whose employer covered
prescription contraceptives could still be somewhere between $60
and $228 per year. Thus, in order to demonstrate any public
health benefit, it must be shown that there are employed women
who want to use prescription contraceptive coverage and who
cannot afford to do so in the absence of coverage but who could
afford the prescription co-payment if coverage is provided.
Second, there are both non-artificial and non-prescription
means available to allow sexual activity without resulting in
pregnancy. The fact that birth control pills may be more
convenient a means of birth control than condoms or natural
family planning does not equate with a claim that they should be
considered basic health care. This is especially true given the
potential health risks prescription contraceptives may pose to
their users. Thus, one can accept the basic proposition that
sexual and reproductive health are important goals without
concluding that prescription contraceptives are part of basic
health care that must be provided by employers.
What I have just said suggests that the state public policy
interest here is hardly unassailable. Moreover, even if one were
persuaded of the state's interest, isn't there a value in attempting
to achieve that interest in a way less intrusive on religion? That
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is especially the case here, where a less intrusive approach is
more likely to be effective, that is, to provide prescription
contraceptive coverage outside of the employment context. The
significant advantage of a non-employment approach is that it
addresses the reality that many women do not have access to
employer-provided health care, either because they are not
employed-and not covered as a beneficiary under a spouse or
parent's plan-or because their employer does not provide for
health care coverage. A non-employment based approach would
do a better job of providing coverage to those most in need of it,
and offers a way of meeting the perceived health need without
doing violence to respect for religion. Given the seriousness of
this issue from the standpoint of the Catholic faith, to not
consider approaches that would actually do a better job of
meeting the state's interest than mandating that employers
provide contraceptive coverage demonstrates a serious lack of
respect for religion. In fact, in September of 2006, a bill was
introduced in the House to require states to cover contraceptives
for women with incomes up to 200% of the poverty level.32
Finally, when we talk about laws requiring Catholic
adoption agencies to place children with homosexual couples, the
state interest is much simpler-it is one of nondiscrimination. It
cannot be said that the state has a positive interest in seeing
homosexual couples adopt children; I have not heard it suggested
that it is affirmatively better to place children with same-sex
couples rather than with heterosexual couples. Rather, the
interest is in not discriminating against homosexuals.
Nondiscrimination is clearly an important state interest-
and lack of discrimination against homosexuals, at least in some
categories, is something the Church also supports. Many
scholars advocate the complete elimination of discrimination
based on sexual orientation. But the question is whether that
goes too far. Is the interest here sufficiently great to justify the
intrusion on religion, to force the religious institution to act in a
way that prevents it from carrying out its religious message?
That is especially important to ask here, because there are surely
plenty of secular adoption agencies. There is no claim that
homosexual couples are unable to adopt because Catholic
32 Incoming Congress Should Enact Legislation to Reduce Abortion Rate, NEWS-
MEDICAL.NET, Nov. 23, 2006, http://www.news-medical.net/?id=21106.
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agencies will not place children with them. And if the interest is.
large, should the state be making greater efforts to accomplish its
aims in some alternative way that does not burden religion?
Again, that is especially the case in those contexts where a way
that is less burdensome to religion may actually do a better job of
accomplishing the state's aim. I will leave that for you to debate.
I hope I've given you something to think about at least as to
the three questions I've addressed: (1) How should we define a
religious institution for purposes of protecting conscience;
(2) What kind of burden on religion is sufficient to give rise to an
exclusion from otherwise generally applicable state laws; (3) How
do we balance the burden on religion against the state's public
policy interest. We may not have clear answers on any of them,
but I think we have enough on the table to facilitate discussion of
the issues.
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